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Abstract. It has been argued that the reservation system in India,
which has existed since the time of Indian Independence (1947), has
caused more havoc and degradation than progress. This being a popular
public opinion, has not been based on any rigorous scientific study or
research. In this paper, we revisit the cultural divide among the Indian
population from a purely social network based approach. We study the
distinct cluster formation that takes place in the Indian community and
find that this is largely due to the effect of caste-based homophily. To
study the impact of the reservation system, we define a new parameter
called social distance that represents the social capital associated with
each individual in the backward class. We study the changes that take
place with regard to the average social distance of a cluster when a new
link is established between the clusters which in its essence, is what the
reservation system is accomplishing. Our extensive study calls for the
change in the mindset of people in India. Although the animosity to-
wards the reservation system could be rooted due to historical influence,
hero worship and herd mentality, our results make it clear that the sys-
tem has had a considerable impact on the country’s overall development
by bridging the gap between the conflicting social groups. The results
also have been verified using the survey and are discussed in the paper.
1 Introduction
The Caste System in India
In the context of the Indian society, caste is defined to be a Hindu hereditary
class of socially equal persons, united in religion and usually following similar
occupations, distinguished from other castes in the hierarchy by its relative de-
gree of spiritual purity or pollution [1]. It is said that the origin of the caste
system is credited to the Vedas, the mythological texts that claim the very ba-
sis of Hindu religion, according to which, the primal man destroyed himself to
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2create a human society. The different castes were created from different parts of
his body. The Brahmins (scholar or priest class) were created from his head, the
Kshatriyas (soldier class) from his arms, the Vaishyas (business class) from his
thighs, and the Shudras (menial labor class) from his feet. The hierarchy in the
caste is determined by the descending order of importance of his body organs.
Another religious theory claims that the caste system was created from the
body organs of Brahma, who is believed to be the creator of the world according
to the Hindu religion. This stratification, though an obvious myth, has stayed
in the Indian society since time immemorial.
Economic Impact of the Caste System
Although the caste groups were supposedly divided along the lines of spiritual
purity, they soon came to determine inflexible occupational roles. The downside
of this system surfaced with the birth of caste-based discrimination, which is
still a dominant phenomenon today. As time progressed, one’s caste became
intrinsically linked with one’s wealth, social status, and even entry into public
places. The society became largely dominated by the so called upper castes, and
the rest were denied economic freedom, forced to work menial jobs and prevented
from trying to improve their economic status. This led to the concentration
of assets, social capital, and power in the hands of one section of the society.
Therefore, while the socially forward classes progressed, the socially backward
classes lagged behind in terms of literacy rates, education levels, income levels,
and other measures of socio-economic well-being.
The Reservation System in India from a Network Theory Perspective
To balance this routine of prejudicial social stratification, affirmative steps were
undertaken to uplift the backward classes, and the reservation system was intro-
duced wherein a certain number of seats are reserved for the members of socially
and economically backward classes at the places of higher education and gov-
ernment jobs. However, it was soon met with a lot of backlash from the socially
forward community, who felt that this system is not meritorious, and provides an
undue advantage to members of the socially and economically backward classes.
In this paper, we study the existing reservation system from a pure network-
theoretic perspective. The network science concepts like homophily [2], weak ties
[3], social distance, opinion formation [4], influence propagation [5,6,7], can help
to explain the positive outcomes of the reservation system. Here, we consider
two social communities, the socially forward and uplifted (FC) and the socially
backward and downtrodden (BC). We establish why and how the reservation
system maintains a very good balance between the two.
Past studies in network analytics by Jackson has shown that network for-
mation and subsequent interaction between the nodes is highly influenced by
homophily [8]. In India, associations amongst the people are seen to be largely
determined by caste-based homophily, hence, for the purposes of our study, we
3choose to term the network formation pattern among the Indian population as
a caste-based homophilic network.
Our motivation comes from the existence of a tangible strength associated
with every weak tie, as proposed by Granovetter in his famously cited theory
of the Strength of Weak Ties [3]. He observed the importance of weak ties to
get new opportunities. This is a very prominent network phenomenon that has
been ignored in past studies of the reservation system, which we have chosen
as the key element of our study. We assume whenever a reservation is given,
it motivates a weak link between BC and FC. The mathematical model aids
us in finding the number of links between the two communities as a measure
of stability for the large scale social structure. We study the cumulative social
capital of the backward classes on discrete time steps and observe how it changes
when this system is in place.
The proposed model is a modified but simple and natural model, where
it is common knowledge that the state of the world changes deterministically
over time, as new network connections are added through time steps. As our
main contribution, we introduce in this paper the prominent role played by the
strength of weak ties in alleviating the divide between the caste groups in the
Indian scenario. We find it sufficient to insert a minimal number of links between
the two clusters, in order to foster harmonic relations between the two conflicting
groups. As a long term aim of the reservation system, we see benefits reasonably
distributed evenly among members from the forward as well as the backward
communities. However, the current statistics show a clear tip in the balance
favoring the socially forward community, with a majority of the country’s shared
resources such as education, wealth, and land-holdings, being in the possession of
or being accessible to only one section of the society. This undesirable disparity
can be seen as the result of many recent studies, including the works of Kumar
and Rustagi [9], Sedwal and Kamat [10] and Biradar [11].
The effects of the absence of the system can not be studied in the present
day scenario due to the obvious reasons, however, a similar study has been
performed by Borooah et al. [12]. The study took into account a social group
within the country which was of the same social, educational and economic
status as the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) in the pre-
independence era. However, the condition of this group was observed to be at
much more elevated state, proving the efficiency of the Reservation System.
Many such similar comparative studies along with extant evidence only bolster
the claim that this system is indeed a beacon of hope for the social disparity in
India [13,14,15,16].
We also conducted a survey4 among people who belong to various educational
institutions following reservation system. These people are affected directly by
the caste based reservation system. After garnering 1005 responses from the
survey, we came up with few observations that are discussed below.
4 The opinion survey details and results are placed in appendix D. In survey, 66.47%
people are from non-reserved category and the remaining are from the reserved
category.
4– When we inquired the FC students regarding their meritorious opinion on
BC students, they told 25.11% of BC students they interacted with had
broken the stereotype associated with the reserved category students.
– The second observation was that the students from BC background, who
were able to gain admission into the educational institution through reserva-
tion, are able to influence 57.57% of their younger siblings and friends from
their community to try and gain admission into the institutions, causing
genuine competition and increase of count on merit performance from BC
background.
Both of these observations show the impact of Forward and Backward breeze
effects caused by the reservation system. This is discussed in detail in section 3,
and the mathematical model is build based on these observations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next, we discuss the required
preliminaries followed by the network-based analysis of caste reservation system.
The simulation results are discussed in Section 4. The paper is concluded in Sec-
tion 5. The proposed model has various future directions that are also discussed
in the conclusion.
2 Preliminaries and Definitions
Let G(V,E) represents the undirected social network under consideration, and
G1(V1, E1) and G2(V2, E2) represent the induced subgraphs of G, where V1 is
the set of all BC nodes and V2 is the set of all FC nodes. Therefore, V1 ∪V2 = V
and V1 ∩ V2 = ∅. Let n1 and n2 be the shorthand notation for the number of
individuals in the BC and FC respectively i.e. |V1| = n1 and |V2| = n2.
We define the edge set B as (E− (E1 ∪E2)) i.e. B consists of precisely those
edges {u, v}, where u ∈ V1 and v ∈ V2, we will henceforth address these edges as
bridges. The distance d(u, v) between two nodes u and v represents the length
of the shortest path between u and v. For each u ∈ V1 i.e. a person belonging to
BC, we define d∗u as,
d∗u = min {k|∃v ∈ V2 3 d(u, v) = k}
Therefore, d∗u is the minimum distance from node u at which it will find at least
one node of V2. We will refer to this parameter as the social distance of node u
from the FC.
A path 〈v1, v2, v3, ..., vk〉 is called an entry path if vk ∈ V2 and vi ∈ V1
∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. Therefore, if d∗u = l, then l is the length of the shortest entry
path starting from node u.
3 Caste Reservation System: A Network Analysis
Approach
The homophily observed in the social structure under consideration is selec-
tion based [2] i.e. the common characteristics that bound people together are
5immutable, in this case, it is the caste of an individual. What the Reservation
System does in essence is, it picks a BC individual and gets it in contact with a
group of closely knit FC individuals. For example, a BC student getting a seat
in a university through the reservation, implicitly creates friendship ties with a
group of close FC students. The addition of such bridges has two-fold benefits,
we term these the forward breeze effect and the backward breeze effect. The for-
ward breeze represents the change in the mindset of the FC, on coming in contact
with the BC and the backward breeze represents the increased motivation felt
by the BC to achieve upliftment, by being influenced by FC members close to
them.
Next, our aim is to calculate the gain in the social capital of the BC as a
function of the bridges added in the network. There exists no universal definition
or technique for measuring social capital [17], this can be attributed to the
inherent subjectivity in the concept of social capital. However, in an exhaustive
survey [18] , the author differentiates between the social capital of different types:
1. social capital of an individual with respect to her position in the social
network.
2. social capital of a group with respect to the underlying relationships within
the group.
3. social capital of a group with respect to the network topological connections
to other groups.
In the Caste Reservation scenario, the cumulative social capital to be calcu-
lated falls under category 3. The social capital of category 3 was first studied in
[19], where the author suggests that the teams with strong outside connections
generally performed better compared to groups with weaker connections outside
their group. Everett and Borgatti proposed a network measure termed group
centrality to quantize social capital of type 3 [20]. We adopt a modified version
of this definition, which fits well with our model. We define the cumulative social
capital of BC as the linear sum of social capital of all the individuals present in
BC. Further, for every individual u in BC, we assume its social distance (d∗u) to
be a direct measure of its social capital. Lower the social distance of an individual
u, higher is its social capital and vice versa.
As stated earlier, a person from BC getting reservation implies that she has
an opportunity to form ties with a set of closely knit FC individuals. But for the
sake of our analysis, we assume that only one tie exists per reservation i.e. all
this bunch of weak ties is equivalent to one bridge while calculating the social
capital of BC. This is a safe assumption, since, we are measuring social capital
as a function of distance, which will rarely change for a pair of nodes in the
network when we remove multiple copies of similar functioning edges. However,
these multiple edges with respect to one reservation are not equivalent to one
bridge in every aspect. For example, the presence of multiple weak ties amplifies
the strength of the bridge across, in a sense that, even if one link breaks in the
future, it does not influence the network topology or social capital significantly.
Our aim is to analyze the fall in d∗u (u ∈ V1) as a function of the number
of random bridges added in the system. Generally, the social networks depict
6scale free degree distribution [21] i.e. P (degree(u) = k) ∝ k−γ , where 2 <
γ < 3. Hence, ideally we must consider both commuities to be scale free graphs.
However, for making the analysis of social distance more tractable we will assume
G1 and G2 to be Erdos-Renyi random graphs [22] with parameters (n1, p1)
and (n2, p2). Empirically, the social distance i.e. d
∗
u falls at nearly the same
rate, independent of whether we consider communities to be scale free graphs or
random graphs for the same number of nodes and edges, as shown in figure 1.
Further, for every u ∈ V1 and v ∈ V2, the edge {u, v} is present with prob-
ability b, which we term as the bridging probability. We define this new proba-
bility space of graphs as Coupled Erdos-Renyi Graphs where both communities
are represented using two Erdos-Renyi random graphs and reservation links are
represented as bridge edges placed between them.
3.1 Social Distance Analysis on Coupled Erdos-Renyi Graphs
The two classes BC and FC are represented by two Erdos-Renyi random graphs
G1(n1, p1) and G2(n2, p2) respectively, where V (G1) = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n1} and
V (G2) = {n1 + 1, n1 + 2, . . . , n1 + n2}. All the results proved in this paper
will be for asymptotically large graphs G1 and G2 i.e. n1 → ∞ and n2 → ∞.
Every possible edge across the two graphs (n1n2 in total) is added with the
bridging probability b.
Let u represents an arbitrary node of BC. Our analysis is aimed to calculate
d∗u i.e. the social distance of node u from the FC. We begin by developing a few
preliminary results.
Lemma 1.
n!
(n− l)! ∼
5 nl as l2/n ∼ 0.
The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix A.
Let Ml represents the total number of possible entry paths of length l with
u as one of its endpoint. The next lemma provides an approximation for the
constant Ml as a function of l.
Lemma 2. Ml ∼ n2(n1)l−1 as l2/n1 ∼ 0.
Proof. To construct an entry path of length l with u as one of its endpoint, we
need a vertex from V2 and a sequence of l − 1 vertices from V1 − u i.e. 1 node
is to be selected from n2 nodes and l − 1 nodes are to be selected from n1 − 1
nodes, and these l − 1 selected nodes can be permuted in (l − 1)! ways.
=⇒ Ml =
(
n2
1
)(
n1 − 1
l − 1
)
(l − 1)!
= n2
(n1 − 1)!
(n1 − l)!
∼ n2(n1)l−1 ( from Lemma 1)
5 f(n) ∼ g(n) if lim
n→∞
f(n)/g(n) = 1
7uunionsq
Further, let Xl represents a random variable which is equal to the number of
entry paths of length l with u as one of its endpoint. Our next result calculates
the average number of entry paths of length l originating from the BC node u.
Lemma 3. E[Xl] ∼ (n2b)(n1p1)l−1 as l2/n1 ∼ 0
Proof.
Xl =
Ml∑
i=1
Yi
where Yi =
{
1 if jth entry path is present
0 otherwise
=⇒ E[Xl] =
Ml∑
i=1
E[Yi] (using linearity of expectation)
An entry path P = 〈vα1 , vα2 , vα3 , . . ., vαl+1〉 of length l exists if (l − 1)
edges ({vα1 ,vα2},{vα2 , vα3}, . . ., {vαl−1 , vαl}) are present in G1 and the bridge
{vαl , vαl+1} is also present. Therefore, the probability that the entry path P
exists, is equal to (p1)
l−1b.
=⇒ E[Xl] = Ml(p1)l−1b
∼ (n2b)(n1p1)l−1 (from Lemma 2)
uunionsq
We are interested only in the case where b < 1/n2, since for b ≥ 1/n2, expected
number of bridges per node in BC will be greater than or equal to 1, which is un-
realistic in the Caste Reservation scenario. Henceforth, throughout the analysis,
b is assumed to be less than 1/n2.
Theorem 1. For a random graph Gn,p, p0 = log(n)/n is the threshold proba-
bility for the property of connectedness.
A detailed proof is available at [23].
Since the two considered graphs G1 and G2 are connected, the above lemma
provides a lower bound on p1 and p2 and hence on the density of the graphs G1
and G2. Therefore, n1p1 > log(n1) and n2p2 > log(n2).
Next, we analyze the quantity Xl i.e. the number of entry paths from node
u as a function of l. For small values of l the number of entry paths Xl will be
negligible (<< 1). Our aim is to find the smallest distance d such that there
exists at least one entry path of length d from node u. We prove that distance
d is equal to log(n1p1)(1/n2b) + 1. Henceforth, for the sake of simplicity, we will
represent the quantity log(n1p1)(1/n2b) by d0.
8Theorem 2. The probability to exist an entry path of length less than or equal
to d0 with u as its endpoint is almost equal to zero i.e. P (Xi = 0) ∼ 0 for
1 ≤ i ≤ d0.
Proof.
P (Xi ≥ a) ≤ E[Xi]/a (using Markov’s inequality)
=⇒ P (Xi ≥ 1) ≤ E[Xi]
∼ (n2b)(n1p1)i−1 (from Lemma 3)
≤ (n2b)(n1p1)do−1 (Since i < d0)
=
1
n1p1
<
1
log(n1)
( from Theorem 1)
=⇒ P (Xi ≥ 1)→ 0
=⇒ P (Xi = 0)→ 1
uunionsq
Further, we will prove that almost always (i.e. with probability close to one)
there exists at least one entry path of length d0 + 1 from u. Hence, proving our
claim that d∗u = d0 + 1.
Lemma 4. For any random variable X, P (X = 0) ≤ σ
2
X
µ2X
, where σX and µX
represent the variance and mean of the random variable X respectively.
Its proof is discussed in Appendix B.
Lemma 5. The standard deviation of the random variable Xd0+1 approaches
zero i.e. σX(d0+1) ∼ 0
Proof.
Xl =
Ml∑
i=1
Yi
=⇒ X2l =
Ml∑
i=1
Ml∑
j=1
YiYj =
l∑
k=0
Zk
where Zk accounts for all YiYj ’s, where the i
th and jth entry paths have precisely
k edges in common. Let |Zk| represent the number of terms in Zk’s summation.
|Z0| ≥
(
n1 − 1
l − 1
)
(l − 1)!
(
n2
1
)(
n1 − l
l − 1
)
(l − 1)!
(
n2 − 1
1
)
9If none of the vertices in the two entry paths are common, then certainly
none of its edges are common either, this gives us the above inequality.(
n1 − 1
l − 1
)
(l − 1)!
(
n2
1
)(
n1 − l
l − 1
)
(l − 1)!
(
n2 − 1
1
)
=
(n1 − 1)!
(n1 − 2l + 1)!n2(n2 − 1)
∼ n2(n2 − 1)
n1(n1 − 2l + 1)n
2l
1
∼ n22n2l−21
The total number of terms in the summation of X2l are M
2
l i.e. approximately
n22n
2l−2
1 . Therefore, most of the summation terms of X
2
l fall into the basket of
Z0.
E2[Xd0+1] ∼ 1 (from Lemma 3)
σ2Xl = E[X
2
l ]− E2[Xd] (by definition)
=⇒ σ2X(d0+1) = E[X
2
d0+1]− E2[Xd0+1]
=⇒ σ2X(d0+1) ∼ 0
uunionsq
Theorem 3. Almost always there exists an entry path of length equal to d0 + 1
with u as its endpoint i.e. Xd0+1 ≥ 1.
Proof.
P (X(d0+1) = 0) ≤
σ2X(d0+1)
µ2X(d0+1)
(using Lemma 4)
=⇒ P (X(d0+1) = 0) ∼ 0 (using Lemma 3 and 5)
=⇒ P (X(d0+1) ≥ 1) ∼ 1
uunionsq
Therefore, almost always d∗u = logn1p1(1/(n2b)) + 1. Since, this formula is
independent of u, almost all nodes in the BC have social distance (d0 + 1). Let
x represents the expected number of bridges added in the system.
=⇒ x = n1n2b
=⇒ d∗i = logn1p1(n1/x) + 1
d∗i =
log(n1)− log(x)
log(n1p1)
+ 1 (1)
The above theorem proves that the social distance of any arbitrary node i
reduces logarithmically as a function of the number of bridges in the system.
Therefore, only the first few bridges are highly effective in reducing the distance
between the two communities, and the bridges that are added later on, don’t
bring a significant change in the social capital of an individual present in BC.
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4 Simulation Results
4.1 Network Models
We have used following synthetic network generative models to study the impact
of adding bridges on the social distance between both communities.
1. Erdos-Renyi (ER) Model: In 1969, Erdos and Renyi proposed a model to
generate random networks [22]. In this model, there are n nodes and an
edge is placed between a pair of nodes with some fixed probability p. The
mathematical analysis of the proposed model is explained for such type of
networks.
2. Barabasi-Albert (BA) Model: In 1999, Barabasi and Albert observed that
real world networks are not random but scale-free6 [21]. They are based on
the rich-gets-richer phenomenon, where a node having higher degree has a
high probability of getting new connections. The degree distribution of scale-
free networks follows power law, so the probability of a node having degree
k is defined as ck−γ , where c is a constant and γ is the power law exponent.
To simulate the proposed model, both FC, as well as BC community, are
generated using the same model and having the same properties like network
size, density, etc.
4.2 Discussion
In this section, firstly, we discuss the verification of math model using simulation.
Secondly, we study how the effective social distance is reduced for different types
of networks.
The verification of math model is shown in Figure 1, where x-axis shows the
number of bridges and y-axis shows the average social distance. To compute
the average social distance, first the social distance is computed for each node
of BC and then its average is taken. The experiment is repeated 10 times to
compute the average social distance for the different number of bridges. In figure
1, red color shows the average social distance computed using equation 1 of the
proposed model and blue color shows the average social distance computed using
simulation on coupled Erdos-Renyi networks.
In the math model, the average social distance is converged to 1 when n1
bridges are placed as each BC node will be directly connected to one FC node.
But in coupled Erdos-Renyi network, the average social distance is not converged
to 1 (close to 1) when n1 bridges are placed as the bridges are placed uniformly
at random and one node of BC can be connected with multiple nodes of FC.
As we know, real-world networks possess scale-free structure, next, we study
the average social distance on scale-free BA networks. The results are shown in
figure 1, where the average degree of the network is same as the corresponding ER
networks. The results show that the scale-free networks follow the same pattern
6 The detailed model is explained in appendix C.
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for average social distance and it decreases logarithmically. The mathematical
analysis of these models is left as the future work. The similar results are obtained
for the networks of different sizes and densities.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Average social distance versus number of bridges
Real-world networks posses meso-scale structures like community and core-
periphery structure [24,25]. We also simulate the proposed model on the following
real-world networks.
1. Facebook Network: Facebook is the most popular online social networking
website today. This dataset is the induced subgraph of Facebook [26], where
users are represented by nodes and friendships are represented by edges. It
contains 63,392 nodes and 816,831 edges.
2. Twitter Network: This is an induced subgraph of Twitter [27]. Each node is
a Twitter user, and each directed edge from user A to user B means that user
A follows user B. This is converted into undirected network for the study
and it contains 81,306 nodes and 1,342,296 edges.
To simulate the proposed model, two copies of real-world networks are cre-
ated to represent BC and FC community. The results for Facebook and Twitter
networks are shown in Figure 2. The average social distance of real-world network
is also compared with the math model by taking the same number of nodes and
network densities. The results show that the average social distance decreases
logarithmically in real-world networks. The bridges are placed randomly and a
node can be connected with multiple bridges, so, the distance is not converged
to 1 after placing n1 number of bridges where n1 is the size of BC community.
The simulation results support the proposed model. The results prove that
the impact of placing more bridges decreases with time and a small number of
bridges are sufficient to maintain the harmonic distance between the communi-
ties.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Average social distance on real world networks, a. Facebook, and b. Twitter
5 Conclusion and Future Directions
The Indian society has suffered for a long time due to the discriminatory sys-
tem of caste-based segregation that initially arose from the concepts of spiritual
purity. Indian government established the reservation system to provide equal
opportunities in education and employment to classes that have historically been
denied access to the resources. In our paper, we looked at the reservation system
from a purely network theoretic perspective, by modeling the polarized Indian
society in the form of a homophilic network and considering reservation to be the
phenomenon by which link formation between the two polar groups is initiated.
We defined the social capital associated with each individual in the back-
ward class as a function of its social distance to forward class, that quantifies an
individual’s access to education and employment opportunities. In the proposed
model, we studied the increase in social capital of a member of the disadvantaged
group as a function of the number of inter-group links (reservation opportuni-
ties). We noted that a very small number of links between the two groups are
enough for the cumulative benefit to increase rapidly. To the best of our knowl-
edge, such a model of the reservation system is the first of its kind.
As a part of future work, we plan to investigate a larger variety of social
applications wherein such a disparity exists, and apply a similar system in order
to test its efficiency. This will allow us to further analyze different parameters
involved in the cumulative social capital of a group. Additionally, we plan on
studying the social structure within the Indian subcontinent in greater detail,
and arrive at a specific percentage of reservation, called as the Ideal/Optimum
Number, which if applied, will cause great amount of uplift within shortest time,
and will balance the distribution of resources between both groups.
We will further analyze the changes in the opinion of people towards other
community that is necessary for the harmonic existence of a society. This also
has been the one important motive of the reservation system. We would like
to propose a mathematical model to study this phenomenon and the opinion
formation in the proposed model. This will help to understand the harmonic
stability in the society due to the opportunities given by the Reservation System.
13
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Appendix
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof.
n!
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Appendix B Proof of Lemma 4
Proof.
P (|X − µX | ≥ a) ≤ σ
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(Chebyshev’s inequality)
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Appendix C Barabasi-Albert Model
In 1999, Barabasi and Albert observed that real-world networks are not random.
They observed that real-world networks follow power law degree distribution
that indicates that there exists very few nodes having higher degrees and most
of the nodes having lower degrees. The real world networks having power law
degree distribution are also called scale-free networks. In scale-free networks, the
probability f(k) of a node having degree k is defined as,
f(k) = ck−γ (2)
where, γ is the power law exponent, and for real-world scale-free networks its
range is 2 < γ < 3.
Based on this observation, they proposed an evolutionary preferential at-
tachment model to generate synthetic networks that follow the properties of
real-world scale-free complex networks [21]. This model starts with a seed graph
having n0 nodes that are connected with each other. At each time stamp, a new
node is added to the network and it makes connections with m already existing
nodes. The probability
∏
(u) of an existing node u to get a new connection is
directly proportional to its degree deg(u). It is defined as,∏
(u) = deg(u)∑
∀v deg(v)
So, the nodes having higher degrees acquire more links over time, and the
degree distribution is skewed towards lower degrees. As the network grows, only
a few nodes called hubs manage to get a large number of links.
Appendix D Survey Details
We conducted a survey7 amongst the very people directly involved and are af-
fected by caste based reservation system. We gathered opinion from both ends,
students who have availed the reservation and general merit students. After
garnering 1005 responses from the survey conducted across various educational
institutions following reservation system, we came up with few observations cor-
responding to our result. In our survey, we observe how much change has already
swept over both communities from either side, which is the direct result of the
reservation system. All people who participated in survey belong to age 17-36.
Below are the questions that we asked in the survey:
– Please select type of institution where you have studied.
1. IIT/NIT/IISERS/govt Institution
2. Semi Government
7 The survey form is available at
https://docs.google.com/a/iitrpr.ac.in/forms/d/1afOga9PbEQeNe3wYVFHKQ1f8JcAoyYIuOlXW3lAJD2A
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3. Private
– Have you ever availed the reservation? Choose one of the options.
1. No
2. Yes (caste-reservation/management quota)
– Average number of relatives (family members) do you see in an year.
– The percentage of family members that you can influence strongly with your
opinion. (answer in %)?
– Question for NON-RESERVED Category Students: What percentage of re-
served category (caste-reservation/management quota) students have im-
pressed you with their skills?(answer in %)?
– Question for RESERVED Category Students: The overall percentage of your
relatives (younger ones) who look up to you for inspiration to try and achieve
like you. (answer in %)?
– Question for ALL Students (Answer it based on your view): What percentage
of your family members mentioned above, can influence their friends and
connections with your opinion (your academic story)? (answer in %)?
